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11 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i 
The nature of this case involves numerou~ causes and 
violations of Appellant's constitutional ri~hts, including,but 
, 
not limited to, the right to effective assi$tance of counsel 
throughout all legal proceedings. 
Petitioner/Appellant maintains and asser~s he has protection 
and certain undenialable rights under the Uiliited states and 
Idaho state Constitutions, and that those rights are being 
systematically violated and have been sinceithe onset of all 
legal proceedings by persons acting under c~lor of law. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
i 
I. Assistance of counsel as enunciated Within the body of 
the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 
I 
II. Subjection to double jeopardy for th~ same offense void 
of due process of law or just compenfation; 
III. 
IV. 
Rights to due process of law and equ~l protection under 
the law as guaranteed within the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution; i 
Adherence to affording full faith an~ credit to judicial 
proceedings and to records enumerateo/ in article four 
section 1 of the U.S. Constitution; • 
v. The right to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances asserted within the first amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution; 
VI. Rights to be free of excessive fines1and cruel and 
unusual punishments as enunciated in1the eighth amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho State Constitution, 
article 1 section 6; 
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VII. 
VIII. 
Rights retained and reserved by t~e people as is 
enunciated within the ninth and t~nth amendments 
to the u.s. Constitution and Idaho state Constitution 
article 1 sections 1, 13 & 18; 
Adherence to Idaho statutes, i.e. titles 20-209A and 
19-2603. 
ARGUMENT 
It is the contention of Petitioner/Appellant with respect to 
I 
the issues presented on appeal that he has\been plagued from the 
onset of the State's case with ineffectiveiassistance of counsel. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel manif$sted itself early on 
I 
when appellant was coerced into changing hts plea of innocence to 
one of guilty through subjugation by creation of fear by original 
I -
counsel appointed to represent him in thisimatter without benefit 
or any attempt to mitigate or exculpate hi~, which is coercion & 
a failute to act. in a responsible and. effe1tive manner. Black's 
law defines coercion in part as: implied, legal or constructive, 
I 
as where one party is constrained by subju~ation to other to do 
what his free will would refuse. ~. person {s guilty of coercion 
if , with purpose to unlawfully restrict amother's freedom of 
! 
action to h~s detriment, take or withhold ~ction as an official, 
or cause an official to take or withhold a~tion. 
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Supreme 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to 
"critical stages" of pretrial proceedings. Critical stages are 
those points in a criminal proceeding when an attorney's 
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presence is necessary to secure the defendant's right to a fair 
trial. Id. at 224-27; see Powell v. Alabam~, 287 U.S. 45, 57 69 
(1932) (period from arraignment to trial i$ "perhaps the most 
critical period of the proceedings" duringiwhich defendant 
"requires the guiding hand of counsel). 
In this case there is no guiding hand w~ich is assertion that 
encompasses counsel appointed to representiappellant at the post-
conviction and appellate levels by Appella~e Public Defender and 
Mini-Cassia Public Defender Office. 
This matter has a plea ag~eement attach~d to it based on 
coercion and policies, customs and practic~s without affording 
the Appellant the opportunity to fully exe~cise his rights, 
including but not limited to rights to due process and equal 
protection under constitutional law. 
Moreover, there are instances of ineffeqtive representation 
at the post-conviction and appellate stage~ of this case. For 
example, the Addendum Brief filed with the Fifth District Court 
for Minidka County on behalf of the Appell~nt, by the Mini-Cassia 
Public Defender Office briefed the court on The Correct Standard 
for Determination on an Award of Credit fo~ Time Served. Public 
Defender supports his position with numeroqs cites to Idaho 
Statute and state case law. Please review Exhibit A Addendum 
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Brief. 
However, he fails to brief the Court on,! or mention any of 
Appellant's other claims as out-lined in th~ Appellant's 
I Petition and Affidavit in Support of Post-Cbnviction Relief. 
Contrary to failures of the Addendum Bri~f to address any of 
his claims is the Appellant's Petition wherie contained therein 
are numerous assertions pointing towards c~gnizable claims, as 
well as written and stated in a fashion th~t should be liberally 
construed in a light most favorable with latitude extended that 
, 
every person whom proceeds pro-se enjoys u~der existing case law. 
Please review Exhibit B Petition and Affid~vit in Support. 
Furthermore, the public defender does nqt discuss with him 
amending or augmenting to his Petition in ~ manner strengthening 
the issues .within it. Additionally, Appell~nt takes issue with 
legal representation provided and/or lack ~hereof, from the 
Idaho State Appellate Office. Again, an e~ample where 
Appellant's Petition is not viewed in a light most favorable to 
him and there materializes the same probl~m as previous, in 
regard to failures to act either through a lack of information or 
making any inquiry, and/or lack of communidation. 
i 
Where sufficient gathered information t~rough inquiry and 
communication, attorney to client should odcur, but instead, 
I 
in effect, the appellate defender dismisse~ the Appellant's 
Petition by having filed a motion with this Court for Leave to 
! 
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Withdraw on the grounds it has no merit, t~ereby throwing him and 
any claims to relief he may have been entitled to thrown to the 
wayside. Please See Exhibit C Order appoi~ting Appellate 
Defender. 
The Supreme Court has stated, "It is no~ established beyond 
doubt that prisoners have a constitutional ~ight of access to the 
" Courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,821',97 S.ct. 1491 (1977) 
The courts have cited the Due Process Claus~, the Equal frotection 
Clause, the First Amendment" and the: 'Privil:eges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV of the Consti tution asi the basis for those 
rights. MURRAY V. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, ~1 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 
2765 (1989). 
The right to appointed counsel is requir~d at criminal trial 
and appellate proceedings and to civil procbedings that may 
deprive a non-prisoner of liberty. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 
U.S. at 7, and Lassiter v. Dept. of Social! Services, 452 U.S. 18 
101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981). 
Prisoners, Persons alike, must have court access that is 
"adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bouhds v. Smith, id. at 
822. All categories of prisoner/persons ar~ entitled to court 
access, and that right extends to Post-conviction proceedings, 
habeas corpus petitions, civil rights actions and other civil 
proceedings. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 627 ("original action 
seeking new trials, release from confinement or vindication of 
fundamental. rights") . 
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II. Article 4 Sections 1 and 2. 
Article 4 Section I states: Full faith and credit shall be given 
in each state to the public acts, records a~d judicial 
proceedings of every other state. And the congress may by 
general laws prescribe the manner in which ~uch acts, records and 
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect, thereof. 
Article 4 Section 1., Opened to interpretation should be as 
an open door swinging both ways. The docum~nts entitled Court 
Minutes, (attached hereto) do not reflect ~ecords of a transcript 
and/or recorded minutes that could be consbrued as records given 
to Full Faith and Credit. 
On the contrary, they are records of a jiudicial proceeding 
recorded minutes that are vague, lacking specifics and clarity. 
i.e. @ Exhibit Also supporting this contention is verbal 
communication from public defender and the court found in the 
Court Minutes at a status hearing 10/3/2011i. i.e. ExhibitD at 
pg. 63. It reads in part: Court explains ~rior employment with 
Minidoka Prosecutor and to discuss with client if any concern. 
However, the record fails to make any f~rther mention of it, 
or whether or not Appellant was made aware of the fact that the 
judge had ascended to his position while e~ployed with the 
minidoka Prosecutor, or whether the issue ~as resolved through 
agreement, if any. This creates a thought where a situation 
requiring the Appellant's legal consent, v~ry well could have 
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had dire consequenes to his ability to exeroise his rights, 
including but not limited to his right of access to the courts, 
all possibly generated by':official interes~s that are favorable 
to the state. 
Article 4 Section 2. @ (1) states in part: The citizens of 
each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several states. The Pri~ileges & Immunities 
Clause is a foundation for a U.S. Constitut~onal right of access 
to the courts. i.e. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n. 6, 
109 S.ct. 2765 (1989). 
III. Issues of Fifth and Eighth Amendments. 
, I 
Article 1 Section 6 Idaho State Consti~ution 
First Amendment, & Rights retained by ~he 
people under 9th, 10th Amendments to the 
I 
U.S. Constitution and Idaho State Constritution 
Article 1 Sections 1, 13, and 18. 
In some cases, prisoners have rights und~r state constitutions 
that are more extensive than federal consti~utional rights. i.e. 
Cooper v. Morin, 49 tiI.Y.2d 69 (1979), cert.denied, 446 U.S. 984 
(1980), and Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 5$9 (1984). Several 
state constitutions support a right to reha~ilitation, or more 
extensive due process rights than the feder~l constitution 
provides. 
The Appellant contends that serving a state (10) year sentence 
running concurrently with another, plus (10) year consecutive 
and (20) year installment plan in a system in use of policies, 
! 
customs and practices geared towards financ}al gains and savings 
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causing (10) year extensions to further state supervision is in 
effect, additional punishments to those al~eady inflicted by & 
through policies, customs or practices cau~ing extreme mental 
distress and confusion, and emotional and ~hysical pain and is 
tantamount to violations of the Fifth and aighth Amendments and 
contrary to Article 1 Sections 1, 6, 13, aQd 18. of the Idaho 
State Constitution. 
To violate the Eighth Amendment, deprivations of basic needs 
must be serious enough to amount to the "w~nton and unnecessary 
infliction of Pain." Rhodes v. Chapmen, 4~2 U.S. at 347; accord, 
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.ct. at 2324. Howe~er, they need not 
inflict physical injury for e.g., Hicks v.Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 
1457 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Extreme conduct by qustodians that causes 
severe emotional distress is sufficient.")~ Scher v. Engelke,943 
F.2d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 1981) (evidence of:"fear, mental anguish 
and misery" can establish the requisite injiury for an Eighth 
Amendment claim), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 11516 (1992), or cause 
lasting or permanent harm. Boretti V. Wiscqmb, 930 F.2d 1150, 
1154-55(6th Cir. 1991). 
Conditions that are physically and ment9lly harmful, but serve 
a legitimate penological objective, such a~ restrictions in high 
security units, may not violate the Eighth Amendment. i.e., e.g. 
Anderson v. Coughlin, 157 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Gir. 1985); Bono v. 
Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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Contrariwise p one court has held that i~ is unconstitutional 
to inflict "serious psychological pain" on!inmates to serve a 
, 
"minor [correctional] concern," "routine ailjd automatic security 
concerns," or "pragmatic interests of lesse,r significance." See 
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993)(en banc). 
At least one other federal appeals cour~ has held that Eighth 
Amendment claims may be supported by "evidE1nce of a serious or 
insignificant physical or emotional injury,I" adding that if 
, 
sufficient pain was inflicted to violate t~e Eighth Amendment, 
such injury would result. Strickler v. Wa~ers, 989 F.2d 1375, 
1381 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,114 S.Ct. 3931 (1993). 
The Eighth Amendment standard "draw[s] ~ts meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark th~ progress of a 
maturing society. " Rhodes v. Chapmen, 452 Iu. S. at 346, quoting 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 1 01 , 78 S.ct. 1590 (1958); accord, 
Helling v. McKinney, U.S. , 
--
113 S.ct. 2475, 2480 (1993). 
The courts have not mentioned much about how these standards 
evolve. However, at least one court has stated that standards of 
decency rise with society's standard of li~ing. Davenport v. 
DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1314-16 (7th Ci~. 1988), cert.denied, 
488 U.S. 908 (1989). 
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IV. Causations and Double jeopardy 
Due process and Time Served 
Appellant maintains that time spent on ~arole up to the 
moment and disposition as to a finding that a parole violation 
has been established, can be credited towards time served. In 
other words, the appellant, acting in good faith can be awarded 
time served for each day spent on parole, $erved in good faith, 
by the Idaho Board of Pardons and Parole up to a finding of fact 
establishing a violation of parole has occ~rred. 
A) Liberty Interests 
The Idaho Board of Pardons and Parole exists not only for 
conducting parole hearings but also to par4on,commute,awarding 
credit for time served and supervise persons released to parole 
pursuant to parole statutes. However, the ~ederal constitution 
does not require states to maintain a parofe system and does not 
create a right to parole release. Greenhol~z v. Inmates of the 
Nebraska Penal Correctional Complex, 442 U~S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct.2100 
(1979); also Inmates v. Ohio State Adult P9role Auth., 929 F.2d 
233, 238 (6th Cir. 1991). There is no con~titutionally protected 
right to parole release or to due process qf law in release 
proceedings unless state statutes or regul~tions create a liberty 
interest in parole release. See, e.g., In :re T~antino, 177 N.J. 
Super. 499, 427 A.2d (1981) (legislature is obligated by state 
I 
constitution to provide for parole). 
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Idaho State Constitution Article 1 Sectiqns 1, 2, 13 and 18 
contain mandatory language therein creating (expectations that 
further defending liberty, special privileg~s, liberty through 
due process of law with justice freely admi~istered to every 
person with remedies afforeed in injury of person, character, 
and with rights and justice administered without denial, delay 
or prejudice. And see, Exhibit lDOC Handbook @ pg. 34, # 5 
in respect to directions toward rehabilitation. Appellant 
asserts that he has served a total of 76 months of incarceration, 
of a 120 month sentence, leaving (44) month~. The Idaho Board of 
Pardons and Parole have jurisdiction over t~is matter and can 
commute and/or provide an award of time serVed for the remainder, 
of the sentence based on time served while under strict parole 
supervision performed in good faith with a ~eccomendation from 
this Court in reflection of the same. 
B) Double Jeopardy, Cruel and Unusual P9nishmen± 
Appellant remains dedicated to the conterition that a (10) yr. 
sentence running concurrently with another, ~ith (10) years added 
under strict parole supervision amounts to ~iolation of the rouble 
jeopardy clause and constitutes cruel and u~usual punishment~sed 
on policies, customs and practices of the lOOC and the state 
attorney generals office. 
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Those whom directly participate in const~tutional violations 
may be held answerable for their actions. See, e.g., Cortes-
Quinones v. Jiminez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 55~, 559-61 (1st Cir. 
1988) (holding Director of Penal Institutions, Corrections 
Administrator and jail superintendent liable for their roles in 
placing a mentally inmate in general popula~ion where there was 
no psychiatric care), cert. denied, 488 U.S~ 823 (1988); Martin 
v. Lane, 766 F.Supp. 641, 649-50 (N.D.IIl. 1.991) (an allegation 
that the warden ordered a lockdown and the qepartmental director 
approved it sufficiently alleged their personal involvement in 
the resulting constitutional deprivations). 
Officials may be held answerable for failures to act if they 
cause constitutional violations. "Acts of omission are 
actionable ... to the same extent as acts o:lf commission." Smith 
v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1978); a¢cord, Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, ~7 S.ct. 285 (1976) (medical care 
, 
claims may be based on "acts or omissions")~ Alexander v. 
Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1990) (prison officials 
"can't just sit on their duffs and not do anything" to prevent 
violations of rights). 
Officials may be held to answer "if they set into motion a 
series of events" that he or she knew or re~sonably should have 
known would cause a constitutional violatio~, even if others 
actually performed the violation. Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 
384, 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); accord, 
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Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829,836 (11th Cir. 1990) (" a 
supervisor can be held liable under section 1983 when a 
reasonable person in the supervisor's posit~on would have known 
that his conduct infringed on the constitut~onal rights of the 
plaintiff, ... even though his conduct was ~ausally related to 
the constitutional violation committed by his subordinate, .... ") 
(footnote and citations omitted). 
Those who set policy, write regulations~ or give orders may 
be held answerable even if not directly involved in enforcement 
of a policy, custom or practice. Redman v.' County of San Diego, 
942 F.2d 1435, 1446-49 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Sheriff who 
tolerated overcrowding and approved a dange~ous classification 
policy could be held liable even though he pid not know of the 
specific danger to the plaintiff; captain who wrote the policy 
could also be liable, cert. denied, 112 C.Ct. 972 (1992); 
Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117,! 1123 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(sheriff and chief jailer could be held lia~le for policy of 
minimizing medical costs), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1989). 
A policy, custom or practice need not b~ formal or written to 
serve as a basis for liability. Leach v. S~elby County Sheriff, 
891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989) (evide~ce that the Sheriff 
"implicitly authorized, approved, or knowi~gly acquiesced" in his 
i 
subordinates' action could support his lia~ility ), cert. denied, 
495 U.S. 932 (1990); Smith V. Jordan, 527 F1.Supp. 167, 170-71 
(S.D. Ohio 1981) (Sheriff might be liable for jails "standard 
procedures"); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1154-55 (5th Cir. 
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1982) (systemwide inj unction against prison,: system's managers 
could be entered based on "prevalent" unlawtful practices), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). 
"tacit authorization" may be sufficient. Fruit v. Norris, 905 
F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990); Bolin v.Ble.ck, 875 F.2d 1343, 
1348 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.C~. 542 (1990); Pool v. 
Missouri Dept. of Corrections and Human Respurces, 883 F.2d 640, 
645 (8th Cir. 1989). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a de~endant from even the 
"risk" of being punished twice for the same! offense. A.bney v. U.S, 
431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977) (double jeopard~ challenges 
immediately appealable because Double Jeop~rdy Clause protects 
against even "risk" of conviction, includin\g "personal strain, 
public embarrassment, and expense of a tri~l more than once for 
the same offense"). 
Although a guilty plea waives some cons~itutional claims, it 
does not necessarily waive a claim of doubl,e jeopardy. U.S. v. 
I 
Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 19~7) (defendant's entry 
of unconditional guilty plea does not waiv~ right to assert a 
double jeopardy claim), cert. denied, 118 S.ct. 1375 (1998). 
In sentencing, the Double Jeopardy Clau~e prohibits courts 
from punishing defendants twice for the sa~e. Ex parte Lange, 85 
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873) (defendant ~ho suffered full 
punishment for offense could not be subjec~ed to another). 
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V.CONCLUSION 
The claims are prima facie arid not beyon~ the realm of 
possibilities. This is not a case where it starts and goes 
nowhere. Therefore, Appellant Respectfully!Requests and Prays 
Cousel be restored to him by this Court's appointment and the 
claims as stated be allowed to move forward vindicating his 
legal rights and allowed to encompass all phases of litigation 
from beginning to end. 
We Request as well, that this Brief be reviewed under Pro-Se 
Standards, viewed liberally in a light most. favorable to the 
Appellant. It is also requested the Court %rant the Motion to 
Augment and Affidavit in support to and in ~upporting Appellant's 
Brief and assertions therein. Appellant req¥ests this Court to 
issue a Declaration stating he has certain ~onstitutional rights 
and the right to exercise those rights. 
We also Request that the Court make a written recommendation 
to the Idaho Board of Parden and Parole rec¢mmending commuting or 
providing an award of time served based on the time spent while 
on supervised parole served in good faith. ~equesting as well, 
that the Court recommend a final discharge ¢n both and/or one of 
his cases. In conclusion, a request as welt to be granted leave 
to amend or bring the case in a more approPfiate legal vehicle, 
or in the alternative any such relief the C~urt deems proper. 
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Respectfully Submitted this twentyeighth day of November 
2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do Hereby Certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be served, by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the foll~wing: 
On the 28th day of November 2012 
TO: Idaho Attorney General 
Lawrence WAsden 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID. 83720 
via the United States Postage Service, 
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. Feb. 3. 2012 9 : 27 AM Min i -C ass i a Pub 1 i c De fen d e r No. 2764 P. 1 
~V -:l..C(l- b 11 
Dennis R. Byington, Esq., ISB No. 2839 
MINI·CASSIA PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE 
111 West 15(11 Street 
2u12 FEe -3 ;:';;j J; sa 
P. O. Box 188 
Buriey,ID 83318 
(208) 878-6801 
Attorney for DefendantIPetitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 






DUAINE EARL, ) 
) 
D~fC!ndant ) ADDENDUM BRIEF 
) 
DU AINE EARL, ) 





STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Rem2nd~mt. ) 
COMES NOW the Defendant! Petitioner, Duaine Earf,. by and through hi~ 
attorney of record, DeMis R. Byington, and submits the following: 
The motion and affidavit of DefendantlPetitioner contains a supporting brief and 
asks for credit for time served. The current status of Idaho Law as briefed by t~ Id~~ 
Sta .. Public Defender', Office is as follows: . . ' • l~ ); l' 
~. ~I " 4~ 
66 
· F eO. 3. 20 ': 2 9 : 27 AM Mini-Cassia Pub! ie Defender No. 2764 P. 2 
BRIEF 
The Correct StanQanis For Deteuninin& An Award Q(Credit For Time Served 
There are various statutes that address credit for time served in Idaho, including 
I.e. §§ 18-309, 19-2603, and 20·209A. When read together; these statutes provide 
different standards for applying credit for time served depending upon whether the time 
was served before or after the judgment is entered, and whether the time was served "for" 
or "in connection with" the offense for which sentence was imposed. Because the credit 
for time served sought is credit for time served post-judgment, after the service of a 
bench warrant for a probation violation, I.C. § 19·2603 is tM applicable standard 
governing his request. 
A question of statutory interpretation is a question oHaw over which the Idaho 
Supreme Court exercises free review. Stote v. Yager, 139 I~o 680, 689,85 P.3d 656, 
665 (2004) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court interprets statutes according to the 
plain, express meaning of the provision in question, and will ~rt to judicial 
construction only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in 
conflict with other laws. [d. (citation omitted). Further, "It is a fundamental law of 
statutory construction that statutes that are inpari material ~ to be construed together, 
to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect." [d. At 689·90, 85 PJd at 665-
666 (citation omitted). Because I.e. §18-309, § 19.2603, and § 20-209A all address 
credit for time served, the statutes must be read in pari matedai. "Statutes in pari 
material (pertaining to the same subject), although in apparent aonflict, are so far as 
reasonably possible construed to be in hannony with each other." State v. Pedraza, 101 
Idaho 440, 442, 614 P2d 980, 982 (1980) (citation omitted). 
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1. r:~~::de:~~5~!i~2~~:=Ft 
Incarceration Is A Consequence OfOc AttribUtable To the Charge Qr 
Conduct For Which The Sentence Is Imposed 
Idaho Code Section 18-309 is comprised oftwo sentences, which state: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment 
was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for ~y period of incarceration 
prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included 
offense for which the judgment was entered. The reqlainder of the term 
commences upon the pronouncement of sentence anq if thereafter, during such 
term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such 
imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the'time during which he was at 
large must not be computed as part of such term. 
I.e. § 18-309. 
Each of these sentences addresses a distinct time periPd. The fIrst sentence 
guarantees a defendant that credit for time served will be reflected "in the judgment/or 
any period of incarceration prior to the entry o/judgment, if such incarceration was for 
the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered." I.C. § 18-309 
(emphasis added). By its own tenns. this sentence ofsectiQQ 18-309 addresses credit for 
"any period of incarceration prior to the entry o/judgment," not to post-judgment 
incarceration. Id. 
Additionally, that same sentence requires that the credit authorized by section 18~ 
309 be reflected "in the judgment. ... " I.e. § 18-309. A 'Judgment of conviction shall set 
forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence." Stale v. 
Thomas, 146 Idaho 592,593, 199 P.3d 769, 770 (2008) (quoting I.e.R. 33(b». Thus, 
because section 18~309 requires that credit for time served awarded under the first 
sentence of that section be reflected in the judgment, and the only credit for time served 
that can be reflected in the judgment is that which occurs pri~r to the issuance of the 
3 
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judgment itself, the first sentence of I.e. § 18-309 can only logically apply to 
prejudgment time served. 
Notably, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized fuat the first sentence ofl.C. 
§ 18-309 "deals with any period of incarceration in a county jail while the defendant is 
awaiting disposition of the charge," and that under that provtsion credit js afforded "for 
any prejudgment incarceration that is attributable to the offe1'1Sl!l for which the sentence is 
imposed." State \IS. Albertson, 135 Idaho 723, 725,23 P.3d!797, 799 (Ct. App. 2001); sc 
also State v. Banb. 121 Idaho 608.826 P.2d 1320 (1992) (analyzing credit for 
prejudgment incarceration pursuant to § 18-309, and post-juqgment incarceration 
accepted in order to rec.eiVt'l probation as a condition of probation imposed pursuant to 
I.C. § 9-2601(2»; Slale v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122,922 P.2d 419 (Cl App. 1996) (denying 
an award of credit sought pursuant to I.C. § 18-309 for preju4gment time served 
voluntarily as a condition of probation). 
Further, this fU'St sentonce ofI.C. § 18-309 contains 8icaveat. Credit for pre-
judgment incarceration is awarded only if"such incarceration was for the offense or an 
included offense for which the judgment was entered." I.C. § 18-309. This "meam that 
the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarcE!ration is a consequence of 
or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence is imposed.tl Stale v, 
Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67. 68,122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2~5) (citation omitted). 
"Thus, there must be a causal effect between the offense and the incarceration in order for 
the incarceration to be 'for' the offense, as the term is used inil.C. § 18-309."ld.; see also 
State v, Hom, 124 Idaho 849, 865 P.2d 176 (Ct. App. (1994) (~dressing a request for 
prejudgment credit for time served and denying credit because the prejudgment 
4 
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incarceration was not caused by or attributable to the charge :for which the sentence was 
imposed); Stale v. Hale, 116ldaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (1989) (addressing a request for 
prejudgment credit for time served and denying credit because the prejudgment 
incarceration was not attributable to the charge for which the sentence was imposed). 
An additional caveat to prejudgment credit was found to exist by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Slale v. Roeh, 102 Idaho 351, 630 P.2d 149 (1981). There. the court 
found that a person who had served prejudgment incarceration on two charges, and who 
had received consecutive sentences on those charges, could only receive credit for time 
served on one of the sentences. Id. At 352. 630 P.2d at 144. This was so because the 
Court fQund "no intent of the legis1ature that a person so convicted should have that 
credit pyramided simply because he was sentenced to consecmive terms for separate 
crimes.» Id. However, "In the case of concurrent sentences, tIe period of presentence 
confinement should be credited against each sentence." Stat' v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 
785,3&6-87,820 P.2d 380, 791-92 (Ct App. 1991). 
2. The Second Sentensce QfI.C. § 18-3Q9 Ad~ses Post-Judammlt 
Incarceration And Awards Credit For time SetlYed For AllY Tim!! 
Served After The Sentence Is Commenced . 
According to the Second Sentence of I.C. § 18-309, "the remainder of the term [of 
imprisonment] commences upon the pronouncement ofsentence .... " I.C. § 18-309. The 
Court of Appeals has recognized that this sentence "address~ the time served after entry 
of judgment." Albertson, 135 Idaho at 725, 23 PJd at 799. That court found that this 
second sentence requires "credit against a sentence for any tiqte spent in custody after the 
entry of judgment, except periods of county jail incarce{ation that were served as a 
condition of probation." [d. Similarly, in applying I.C. § 18-309 to a claim for post-
5 
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judgment incarceration. the Idaho Supreme Court has found. that it "notably does not base 
credit on any factor other than actual incarceration .... " Taylor v. Slate, 145 Idaho 866, 
869, 187 PJd 1231,1244 (2008); see also Stal, Y. Machen, '100 Idaho 167,595 P.2d 316 
(1979) (finding that credit for time served during a period of retained jurisdiction should 
be credited towards a sentence under the terms ofl.C, § 18-309), overruled on other 
grounds by Rhodes v. State, __ Idaho ----> _ P .3d __ (March 17, 2Q 1 0). 
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals may have previo~ly applied the "for the 
offense'~ limitation found in I.C. § 18-309 to a claim for cre4it for time served post 
judgment. See State v. teal, 105 Idaho 501, 670 P.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1983). However, 
whether the court did is unclear. In Teal, a probationer absconded from supervision in 
Idaho and eventually was arrested in California on unrelated: charges. Id. At 502, 670 
P.2d at 909. Because a bench warrant bad been issued on the Idaho probation violation 
allegat.ions. the California authorities "kept the [Idaho] sheriff informed of the pending 
criminal charges in California and of [Teal's] ultimate conviption." [d. At 503,670 P.2d 
at 910. At some point. the Idaho sheriff filed a "detainer" with the California authorities, 
and Mr. Teal requested a hearing on his Idaho probation violation allegations. Id. Mr. 
Teal was delivered to the Idaho sheriffwbile still serving his! California sentence. Id. 
Mr. Teal subsequently sought credit for all time served "sinc~ he was arrested and 
confined in California." Id. at 504, 670 P .2d at 911. The Idaho Court of Appeals found 
that Teal was not entitled to credit for any time spent in California custody because. 
"Teal's arrest and confinement in California, before he was delivered to the Idabo 
authorities. hod nothing 10 do with the Idaho convictions." Id (emphasis added) (citing 
I.e. § 18-309,19-2602, and 19-2603). 
6 
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Because the Idaho Court of Appeals cited both section 18-309 and section 19. 
2603. and because the court never mentioned whether Teal was ever served with the 
bench warrant that had been issued, the exact basis oftbe Co~ of Appeals' opinion is 
unclear. Although Teal may have been served with the bench wanant at some point, it is 
equally possible he was not. The Court of Appeals finding that Teal's incarceration in 
California "had nothing to do with the Idaho convictions," tepds to indicate that the 
bench wanant was never served. Although at some point the Idaho sheriff filed a 
"detainer" with the California authorities, this could have simply been a format request 
that California notify Idaho of Mr. Teal's imminent release fi!om custody, as opposed to a 
request that Teal be served with the warrant for his arrest. SeJl Stale v. Bronk,ma. 109 
Idaho 211, 214, 706 P.2d 100, 103 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding ~ a "detainer" as used in 
r. c. § 19-5001 entails written communication from a receiving state requesting that the 
sending state notify the receiving state ofthe prisoner's immipent release from custody, 
or to hold the prisoner after his release from the receiving state). Given that the basis of 
the Court of Appeals' decision is unclear. and the holdings of A/bert son and Taylor, Teal 
should not be read to hold that the limitation articulated in th~ first sentence of I.C. § 18-
309 is applicable to claims fOf credit for time served post-judgment and granted. pursuant 
§19-2603. Alternatively, to the extent Teal is read to appJy the "for the offense" 
limitation articulated in the first sentence of § 18-309 as applipible to claims for credit 
for time served post-judgment, that holding should be found to be incorrect and not the 
Jaw of Idaho as it is in contravention of the plain language of the statute and the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Taylor. 
3. Section 19·2603 Addresses Post-Judgment IocNceration When A 
Defendant Is Involuntarily Incarcerated While pn Probation 
7 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that I.e.! § 18-309, "does not directly 
address the question of credit for time served after an entry of judgment for defendants, 
who ... have been placed on probation but ultimately have had their probation revoked. 
Siale v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280, 954 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1998). Rather, I.C. § 19-2603 
specifically addresses credit for time served when a previously suspended sentence is 
executed, or when a person has served a period ofincarcera~on for probation violations 
during a period of withheld judgment. See I.C. § 19-2603; Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28, 
922 P.2d at 424-25 (granting credit for time served pursuant,to I.e. § 19-2603 for pre-
judgment time involuntarily served during a period ofwithh~ldjudgrnent after service of 
the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant). In relevant part, I.C. § 19-2603 state, 
.. the time such person shall have been at large under such sU$pended sentence shal] not be 
counted as a part of the term ofms sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence 
shall count/rom the datt o/service of such bench warrant." [d (emphasis added). 
Unlike I.C. § 18-309, the plain language ofl.C. § 19-2603 does not require that 
credit granted for time served under this section be reflected in the judgment. This 
makes sense because the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically found that an "order 
revoking probation is not a judgment. " Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594, 199 P.3d at 171. 
Rather, when the trial court has sentenced the defendant, but ~uspended execution of the 
sentence and placed the defendant on probation, upon revocation of the probation "the 
original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may be! executed according to 
law .... " I.e. § 19-2603. Because a new judgment is not issued, credit granted for time 
served post-judgment cannot appear in the judgment. 
8 
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Further, unlike I.e. § 18-309, the plain language ofLC. § 19-2603 does not limit 
an award of credit for time served to those instances where tile post-judgment 
incarceration "was for the offense or an included offense foriwhieh the judgment was 
entered." Compare I.C. § 18-309 and I.e. § 19-2603. Rathert I.C. § 19-2603 focuses 
solely on the service of the bench warrant issued for a proba~on violation. See I.e. §§ 
19-2602, -2603. "Where a statute with respect to one subj~t contains a certain 
provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statl,.lte concerning a related 
subject is significant to show that a different intention existe<l." Yager, 139 Idaho at 690, 
85 PJd 666 (citing Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160. 164,595 Pi,2d 309, 314 (1979». 
Thus, the fact that the Idaho legislature declined to include the additional 
language that the time be served solely for the offense for which the judgment was 
entered in I.C. § 19-2603 is significant to show that no such ~uirement applies when the 
time is served after service of a bench warrant on a probation violation. Rather, in 
conformance with both the second sentence of I.e. § 18-308 and 19-2603, once a 
sentence commences, credit is awarded for "any other period.$ of post-judgment 
incarceration.'/ Served "from the date of the service of [a probation violation] bench 
warrant." Albertson, 135 Idaho at 725,23 P.3d at 799 (emp~is added); I.e. §§ 19-2602, 
-2603. 
4. ==a;5£e~ 
For Which Sentence Was Imposed 
Section 20· 209A, which appears jn the section of the ~ode relating to the State 
Board of Corrections, further addresses credit for time served ;both before and after 
judgment. The section states: 
9 
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When a person is sentenced to the custody ofthc: boa(d of correction, his term of 
confinement begins from the date of his sentence. A Person who is sentenced 
may receive credit toward service of his sentence for ~irne spent in physical 
custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, ifthat':detention was in connection 
with the offense for which the sentence was imposed.! The time during which the 
person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of 
the board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall 
not be estimated or counted as part of the term for which he was sentenced. 
I.C. § 20·209A (emphasis added). 
This section can be read harmoniously with sections 18-309 and 19-2603. 
Section 20·209A recognizes that credit for any time in physiqaI custody may be awarded 
when the detention is merely "in connection with the offense .... " I.e. § 20-209A. This 
language is broad enough to encompass both the mandatory award of credit for time 
served prejudgment when the incarceration is "for" the o:ffen$e, and post~judgment 
following the service of a bench warrant. See I.C § 18-308, § 19-2603. In addition, by 
utilizing language broad enough to encompass both, the legislature recognized that 18-
309'5 "for" the offense standard was not the only applicable standard, but rather that 
some credit could be awarded when the incarceration did not ~eet that standard. i.e. § 19-
2603' s date of service of a bench warrant standard 
5. Sections 13-309. 19-2603. And 20-209A Can fe Read HarmoniQusly 
When I.e. § 18-309, § 19·2603, and § 20-209A are r~ together it is apparent 
that credit for time served is awarded as foUows: 
1) Prejudgment incarceration is awarded when: 
(a) the incarceration was for the offense or an ~nc1uded offense for which 
the judgment was entered (first sentence of' § 18-309), or 
(b) if served 
(i) during a period withheJd judgment (fll'St sentence of § 18-
309; Buys, 129 Idaho at 126-27,922 P2d. at 423-24); and 
10 
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(ii) served involuntarily (State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 826 
P.2d 1320 (1992); I.C. § 19~2601(2»; and 
(iii) is served after the service of Ii bench warrant (§ 19-2603). 
(c ) If there is more than one sentence for which prejudgment 
incarceration may be awarded: 
(i) 
(ii) 
credit is awarded on only one ~ntence if the sentences 
were ordered to be served consecutively (State v. Hoch, 
102 Idaho 351, 630 P.2d 143 (1981»; 
credit is awarded on all senten<;es if the sentences are 
ordered to be served concurrently (State v. Hernandez, 120 
Idaho 785, 820 P.2d 380 (Ct. f\pp. 1991 ». 
2. Post-judgment incarceration is awarded for my actual incarceration which 
QCCurs after the judgment (§ 18-309), so long ~ the incarceration is in 
connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed (§ 20M 
209A), including when the time is served afte~ service of a be~b warrant 
for a probation violation (§ 19-2603). 
3. No credit for time served is awarded for time 
(i) during which the defendant is tempol'llfiIy released from 
imprisonment (§ 18-309); or 
(ii) during which the defendant is voluntarily absent from a 
penitentiary, jail, or other Board ofCotrection facility, or from the 
custody of an officer (§ 20-209A); or 
(iii) which is served voluntarily as a condition of probation (Stale v. 
BaTIks, 121 Idaho 608, 826 P.2d 1320 (992); I.e. § 19-3601(2»). 
ARGUMENT 
The Order on motion to revoke probation attached as exhibit II A" grants the 
petitioner credit for time served but no amount of time is included. Our calculation of 
time for which credit should have been included is 232 days, see exhibit "B". Current law 
should grant that as credit for time served. 
II 
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The Petitioner has also asked the court to look at the ~Ssue of credit for time while 
on supervised probation and supervised parole. The parole board does make a 
determination as to whether to grant credit while on parole 011 to forfeit that time on 
parole violations. The petitionee had time forfeited, see exhibit "C". He cites fedecallaw 
and various state cases and code sections to support his position. We cannot say that his 
position is totally without merit. We ask the court to review his brief in support of that 
position. 
DATED Tbis .3 day of February, 2012. 
12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L day ofFeb~, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the attorney named below in the manner 
noted: 
Michael Tribe 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P,O. Box 368 
Rupert, ID 83350 
__ .. By depositing copies of the same in the United Stat~ Mail, postage prepaid, at the 
Burley Post Office in Burley, Idaho. 
__ By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney at the address 
above indicated. 
/ By telecopying copies of the same to said attorney at ihislher telecopy number 
__ By delivering a copy thereof to said attorney's mail file or basket at the Mini 
County Courthouse in Rupert, Idaho. 
13 
78 




. .. ~~. : .'. . I,. 
"-' j f "fi" .. 
II( 1'D DISftICT COOIlT 0., '1'IlI nn'll JUDlctJ'iI.mC.r~"'m" 
STAB 0' UWIO, DI AlID I'OIl TJII cor.nr.n' OJ' YDtIl)()Q 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No. CR-98-01107*O 
l. The date of disposition on the probation violation is/was 
November 25,2002, (hereinafter called di~position date). 
2. The State of Idaho was represented by counsel, Alan Goodman, 
of the Minidoka County Prosecutor's office. 
3. The defendant DUAINE FREDRICK EARL, app~ared personally. 
4. The defendant was represented by couneel, David G. Pena. 
S. John M. Melanson, District Judqe, presiding. 
11 . wszm.nmraetpT (8) 01 cgy:tCZ1CII 
The defendant DUAINE FREDRICK EARL was ~nformed by the Court 
at the time of the disposition of the nature of his existing judgment(s) of conviction, which isfare: 
ORDER ON MOTION TO REVOKE PROBATION Page 1 of S 
"EXHIBIT .L · 
5Pagea 
79 
f:, _ ~. _, .... I , •. ' 
("" .', ~ , 
l,;; 
. 
Inmate Name D"''''''o 'C. Eo..r~ 
IDOC No. '2.~Q "10 20li AVG IS PM. I',; 44 
Address.5 I '- « Po Be!) ¥- ~<.? 1 
BOi·~:4! .. , 1: Q X'707 Ii , ... ~ 
, 
-- '.,~ .. Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE --"'S_TA _____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF mIn i 00 154 
Dc,"l •• I~L t=- EA-c.l ) 
Case NO.CV ."2.0\ \ - tFfl ) 
Petitioner, ) 
) PETITION AND AFFIDAVlT 
vs. ) FOR POST CONVICTION 
) RELIEf' 




The Petitioner alleges: 
1, Place of detention if in custody: ...... 5 ....... :I: __ .>..<!._l: .. ..... ----------
2, Name and location of the Court which imposedjudgementlsentence: b 4s/,.;( l-
i'.> f p1ztJ:tc/o ISs Ccvn:t'( t idA f>£ k. !J1: D 
3. The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) Case Number: LRqi'- 01101 
(b) Offense Convicted: S\-a.h+hr'{ R.f (,. 
4, The date upon which sentence was imposed and the tetms of sentence: 
a. Date of Sentence: .:1 / (Q I i!!L'J(JO 
b. Tetms of Sentence: I F,.t 2 'r.ilieterro I ~o.h f D 2 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
Revised: 10113105 
1 
5. Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
I)(l Of gUilty [ J Of not guilty 
6. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence? 
[ ] Yes ~ No 
If so, what was the Docket Number of the Appeal? -----
7. State concisely all the grounds on which you base your application for post 
conviction relief: (Use additional sheets if necessary.) 
.~-
~ \l, ... \~-ho '" J~ 
\ .l.! \C\ - 2.~o'?:. 




Petitions in State or Federal Court for habeas corpus? fcAy .:...\ "'I.~tA & 
Any other petitions, motions, or applications in any other court?-;jcc.t ....... __ 
If you answered yes to a or b above, state the name and court in which each 
petition, motion or application was filed: 
CD' .... ·b .. 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
Revised: 10113/05 
2 
9. If your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you, 
state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests: 
(a) ______________________ _ 
~)----------------------------------------
(c) ______________________ _ 
10. Are you seeking leave to proceed in fonna pauperis, that is, requesting the 
pr?ceeding be at county expense? (lfyour answer is "yes", you must fill out a 
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
I>( Yes [ ]No 
11. Are you requesting the appointment of counsel to represent you in this case? (If your 
answer is "yes", you must fill out a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and supporting 
affidavit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
[ ] Yes 
12. State specifically the relief you seek: 
fv\\ +-u,... re..-\t. .... re.. c\."'~ o~ fc.bC'l.l""ry t.'1~ lDlo. 
1..10..,\)... tc.t"cn\II\"'-\c.. ~\<o <"'S(.., e..$. ()~ ~.....\- t:l~f.. ' 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
Revised: 1 OJ 13/05 
3 
• 
13. This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in support of the petition. (Fonns 
for this are available.) 
DATED this 110- day of ~IL:$. (... 
STATE OF IDAHO ~J 
~&.o.......~)ss 
. · dn: County of 1'\9-tn .k Jr ) 
,20.-1..L. 
-:L...J ___ Jo,D.d.AJOL.Ll.'nLJ..f;e~ __ Eo..u...I.r-4I_, being sworn, deposes and says that the party is the 
Petitioner in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF are true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me this \.~'<day of 
(SEAL) 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF· 4 
Revised: 10/13105 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the It. T~ay of {lId 14 ~ {- ,20-LL. I mailed a 
copy of this PETmON FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF for the purposes of filing with the 
court and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system to the U.S. mail system to: 
(fl,'A ,~ k q. County Prosecuting Attorney 
PO Box j~8"" 
~4~4  
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 5 
Revised: 1 0113105 
5 
• 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION PETITION 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
~~ )ss 
COUNTY OF .pm'mo ke ) 
::r:. Dua.,'".Q/ ,... Ea.\"' 1 ' being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
On (y)" tc b ,-ria) cOoo f/ao{)taD/e. fOlC, f Harl-. 
III ljod £be'lb., fOlL/\-tL{ DR min/do ttlJ....t .5:£,,4"c\N.d :r1j1~ 
D~P2'ldol\t foC:Th2c /!c,'me. ~(> Sfo1:(J.-ktlf ~e. ~d 
Wets a I I Cf rea,. LLn, Coed Se.t\ fc!sD C e.. 'rho.:+ 1"21(,1 de. v..p £11\ 
Q.qql'CV1a..t=e aD) Ljeof' de tu'-rYJI·"o.h --ref''''' or pu ",:>h tP'e.i\ 1-) 
PILRSc....o"t To \.e. ;q .. 2..5l3 Tb£. ,Seo#nt:I;"q Court 5e+ 
/i-e.. f1)4;t-;IY\Urt\ am~u.o{ of pu,,:s.hrnorat 70 b...Q, ~ed 
, HAl I L.)t±h The ve.cboq e. 20 t Ta br..e~~ J 
<' 
~ r CC\ of Co n f.;,~ Yn9 n 4- be90 " mo..f.c.h. ""Tf 2000 
Lh 9 do. 'l~:Q .s~ f\{e nt' e c t)ko 'rh:5 .sb" 1-t1..+-e.. 
prO'lld.es J"ha f Th9 'TUv,e .spEll "'- In {Jb'-l~J~ClI Cu.)iod'1 
'1\ (;p 0 Oot! c...J iot') w;.J..A 'rA e.. oIPe ns e Co r L,Jt. t"'c.A J=h 'ElL 
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I. ceSfec.1Dt!hj ~Lt.,e..:s+ :rtllS C4$e be elosed and 
my e. (V// Cl(lhis he.. tesfcred .pu.{"SLJQO~ To 
I.e.... Ig·:3ID 
Further your affiant sayeth not. 
L~ ~ture of Affiant 
~"" SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED TO before me this \~day of 
~-..:::.~~ ,20~\ 
My Commission Expires: l.as\. ~ -'\...~ 
AFFIDA VIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION PETITION - ... ~ 7 ) 
Revised: 10/13/05 
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nnis R. Byington, Esq., ISB No. 2839 
I-CASSIA PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE 
2 11 West 15th Street 
.0. Box 188 
3 urley, Idaho 83318 
elephone: (208) 878-6801 
4 8~illlHe: (208) 878-3493 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 










Case No. CV 2011-697"'0 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
~----------------------------------------------------
COMES NOW Dennis R. Byington, Court appointed Public Defender for the Petitioner in the 
16 bove-entitled action, and moves the Court for an Order appointing the Idaho State Appellate Public 
17 
efender's Office to represent the Petitioner, Duaine Earl, in all matters relating to Petitioner's appeal 
18 0 the Idaho Supreme Court, a Notice of Appeal having been filed with the Clerk of the above Court 
19 n February..;(1 , 2012. 
20 
21 







he law in such cases made and provided. 
DATED This ~ day of February, 2012. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 







Feb.27. 2012 8:44AM ~ini-Cassia Pub] ie Defenaer No. 3286 P. 5 
1 CElUlFIWE OF SERVICE 
2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~1 day of February, 2012, I served a true and correot copy 
3 f the foregoing document upon the attorney named below in the manner noted: 
\1) (V '(~) 
4 Jance Stevenson Lawrence WaSden Sara Thomas 
rosecuting Attorney Idaho Attorn~ General State Appellate Public Defender 
5 .0. Box 368 P. O. Box 83720 3050 North Lake Harbor Lane 
upert, lD 83350 Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 Suite 100 
6 Boise, ID 83703 
If">---=- By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the Burley Post 
8 Office in Burley, Idaho. 




















g........~ By telecopying copies of the same to said attorney at hislher telecopy number __ _ 
By delivering a copy thereofto said attorney's mail file or basket at the Minidoka County 
Courthouse in Rupert, Idaho. 
28 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBUC DEFENDER - 2 
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Dennis R. Byington, Esq., ISB No. 2839 
MINI-CASSIA PUBUC DEFENDER OFFICE 
111 West 15th Street 
P.O. Box 188 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
(208) 878-6801 
Attorney for Petitioner 
No. 3286 P. 6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
DUAINE EARL, Case No. CV 201 1-697'D 
Petitioner, 
VS. 










NOTICE AND ORDER APPOINTING 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER IN DIRECT APPEAL 
Respondent. 
TO: THE OFFICE OF THE IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The above named Petitioner filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief relating to his 
conviction to the charge ofStatutol)' Rape, in Minidoka County Case No. CR 1998-1107*D. 
A hearing on the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief was held in open court on Februaty 6, 2012. After considering the argument 
of counseJ, the pleadings and the verified Petition, the Court took the Post Conviction matter 
under advisement. The State's Motion for Summaty Dismissal was granted, and Petitioner's 
Petition for Post Conviction Reliefwas dismissed. The Petitioner, therefore, requests the aid of 
counsel in pW'Suing an appeal from the adverse decision in this District Court. 
NOTICE AND ORDER APPOINllNO STATE APPELl,ATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN DIRECT APPEAL 
PSie 1 
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The Court being satisfied that said Petitioner is a needy person entitled to the services of 
the State Appellate Public Defender pursuant to Idaho Code §§ t 9-852 and 19-854 and the 
services oftha State Appellate Public Defender are available pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-863A; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-870, that the State 
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the Petitioner in all matters as indicated 
herein, or until relieved by this Court's order. 
ADDITIONALLY, IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Minidoka County 
Public Defender, remain as appointed counsel for the purpose of filing any motion(s) in the 
District Court which, if granted, could affect judgment, order or sentence in the action. The 
Minidoka County Public Defender shall remain as appointed counsel until all motions have been 
decided and the time for appeal of those motions has run. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED. pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-963, that the County 
shaH bear the cost of and produce to the State Appellate Public Defender a copy of the following 
within a reasonable time: 
1. The transcript of the Motion for Summary Dismissal of Petitioner's Post 
Conviction Relief Hearing held February 6. 2012, or related proceedings which 
are recorded by the Court and which have been previously prepared. 
If the State Appellate Public Defender's Office discovers during appellate preparation that 
an item, within the control of the Clerk or Reporter is missing. omitted or not requested and it is 
necessary to the appeal, the item shall be produced and the cost shall be paid by the County. 
The State Appellate Public Defender's Office is provided the following information by 
the Court: 
NOtiCE AND OROER APPOINTtNO STATE APPELLA1"E PUBLIC DEFENDER IN DIREct' APPEAL 
PIJgc2 
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t. The Defendant is in custody of the Department of Correction, State of 
Idaho; 
2. The Defendant's current a.ddress is: I.C.C., Unit Pl-24B, P. O. Box 70010, Boise, 
ID 83707 
3. The Defendant may be contacted by telepbone at the following number: 
DATED this 21'" day of February, 2012. 
NOTICE AND ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBUC DEFENDER IN DIRECT AI'PEAL 
l'age 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~c..~, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -L day of~, 2012, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the individuals named below in the manner noted: 
Lance Stevenson 
Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, 10 83350 -~ 
Sara Thomas 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 North Lake Harbor Lane 
Suite 100 
Boise,1O 83703 - i~ 
Duaine Earl #28970 
I.e.c., UnitPl·24B 
P. O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 - \~f\vJ 
Maureen Newton 
Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 368 I 
Rupert, ID 83350 -('(I.cJ 
Supreme Court -t'\'\evJ 
ATTN: Clerk 




P. O. Box 83720 . 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 ·-~~·W 
Dennis R. Byington -.~~ 
Public Defender 
P. O. Box 188 
Bur]cy, ID 83318 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, at the 
Burley Post Office in Burley, Idaho. 
By hand deJivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney at the address 
above indicated. 
By telecopying copies of the same to said attorney at hislher telecopy number _ 
--' 
By delivering a copy th .... f to said C~ or basket at the Minidoka 
County Courthouse in Rupert, Idaho. ~
PArry TEMPLE 
Clerly' (-
/ J ~ .. :. i 
. --/~'ltf' "~I 
By. / .. f,,;i ~l)(~&J' 
:Deputy Clerk 
\ 
NOTICE AND ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPEL. LATE PUBLIC DllFENDER IN DIRECT APPBAL 
I)age 4 
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CASE i= 
COURT MINUTES 
lOll OCT -3 PM 3: CO 
CV-2011-0000697 
Dualne Fredrick Earl #28970, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, DefendanlCfSt'J;.· GLEflK 
/ " DEPUTY 
Hearing type: Status I 
Hearing date: 10/3/2011 
Time: 10:05 am 
Judge: Jonathan Brody 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-l 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk.: Janet Sunderland 
Party: Duaine Earl #28970, Attorney: Mini-Cassia Public Defender 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Mike Tribe 
Petitioner is incarcerated 
Court calls case, briefly reviews filings on both civil case and underlying criminal case 
Mr. Byington has just received copies last Friday so have not reviewed 
Mr. Tribe note have filed objection in underlying criminal case, would ask for status In civil 
case and then obtain a briefing schedule 
Mr. Byington notes only appointed in civil matter - Court appoints to criminal matters as 
well 
Court explains prior employment with Minidoka Prosecutor and to discuss with client if 
any concern, will set for status in 30 days to address if any amendment of petition, respond 
to State's motion and do briefing deadline on State's motion - set for status on 11-7 -11 on 
both cases. 
10:09 a.m. recess 
.,1 ,'bt't 




CR-1998-0001107 and CV·2011·697 
... ,,' " 
i" ~!. J:"l .)- ""~ i"_ ~: 
" ".,..,." .... ~-
Cr\SE it OI-2Qt\:k~1 
20 II NOV -1 PH 3: 42 
('AllY TS\;.--Lt.. "LC.i: ;;\ 
State of Idaho vs. Dualne Fredrick Earl #28970 and Dualne F~ V State of 
Idaho \ , DEPUTY 
Hearing type: Status on Post-Conviction and underlying criminal case 
Hearing date: 11/7/2011 
Time: 10:37 am 
Judge: Jonathan Brody 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland 
Defense Attorney: MIni-cassia Public Defender 
Prosecutor: Michael Tribe 
Defendant not present - in custody of Idaho Dept. of Correction, 
Court calls cases, matters are set for status, Mr. Byington has been appointed as counsel on 
both cases. 
Mr. Byington addresses Court, has had some communication with client and outlines what 
he thinks the petitioner's argument is. 
Mr. Tribe notes he has filed responses 
Court notes that if sentence really has expired maybe a habeas proceeding is in order - Mr. 
Byington notes that one has already been filed, needs more time, not sure if proceed just on 
petitioner's brief or if will file further documents 
Court discusses with counsel and will set petition for Post-conviction for hearing on the 
State's motion to dismiss Post-Conviction in 30 days, will also set the motion for credit for 
time served on underlying case, set on 12-12-11. Counsel to file additional documents 
prior to hearing, advice court ASAP if need motion to transport 
10:43 a.m. recess 
COURT MINUTES 
CV-2011-0000697 and CR-1998-1107 
. "t t <..EliK 
Dualne Fredrick Earl #28970. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho. Defen~~' U"P\lI'I 
,DE 
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
Hearing date: 12/12/2011 
Time: 11:45 am 
Judge: Jonathan Brody 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Clerk: ,anet Sunderland 
Party: Dualne Earl #28970, Attomey: Mini-Cassia Public Defender 
Party: State of Idaho, Attomey: Mike Tribe 
Petitioner is Incarcerated so not present, 
Court calls case, here on motion to dismiss on PC case and status on criminal case, inquires 
Mr. Byington addresses court, still trying to get information from State explains, asking for 
another 30 days to argue motion to dismiss 
Court notes that did meet with counsel in chambers and did discuss when argument would 
be heard 
Mr. Byington briefly reviews status of both cases, need to set both cases together, will be 
ready to hear State's motion to dismiss at next hearing - Mr. Tribe asks for more time 
Court sets hearing on 2-6 and any filings from counsel to be received by 1-23-12. 
11:48 a.m. recess 
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COURT MINUTES 
CV-2011-0000697 and CR-1998-107 
C t, -" .(:V/:201\:.-bCfl 
2Il2 FEB -6 PM 3: 26 
Duaine Fredrick Earl #28970, Plaintiff "" State OrJdaho. DereD.J'!~·. . ... , ;( 
'. ., DEPUTY 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 2/6/2012 
Time: 9:00 am 
Judge: Jonathan Brody 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1 
Court reporter: Maureen Newton 
Minutes Oerk: Janet Sunderland 
Party: Duaine Earl #28970, Attorney: Mini-Cassia Public Defender 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Mike Tribe 
Petitioner is NOT present by telephone 
Court calls cases; court has attempted to contact prison and can only reach answering 
machine and inquires of Mr. Byington 
Mr. Byington responds, would like to try and contact Mr. Earl again this morning, they were 
aware of the hearing today, do not want to delay matters, is ready, is briefed, have short 
arguments and really just want to get submitted 
Court tries to contact Mr. Earl again and reached voice mail- explains did leave message 
for Mr. Earl to contact Mr. Byington - continue one week 
9:03 a.m. recess 
9:16 a.m. session 
Court, counsel and petitioner are now present 
Mr. Tribe addresses court re: CR-1998-1107 have agreed to 232 days' time served on 
underlying criminal case 
Mr. Byington addresses court, agreed to 232 days' time served 
9:17 a.m. Mr. Tribe makes State's argument in support of Motion to dismiss on CV-2011-
697, cites considerations, Petitioner appears to be asking for credit for time served for all 
time on probation and also while absconded, State objects and cites to Idaho Code 18-309 
and 19-2603 and case of Taylor V State @ 1451866 and reads a portion from the case into 
the record and case cites to Idaho Code 20-209(A), continues argument, only entitled to 
credit for time served while in actual custody of the department 
9:21 a.m. Mr. Byington responds to State's motion and cites considerations, petitioner 
asking for credit while in supervised probation and supervised parole, cites to exhibit C of 
his brief and continues argument, submit all to consideration of the court, 
Court inquires - Mr. Byington asks Court to consider all issues submitted in affidavit 
9:24 a.m. Mr. Earl addresses the court regarding a year he spent in county jail in 2006 that 
was not given credit for - Mr. Byington responds, that may have been the Cassia County 
Case, did research carefully and went through everything and thing that the 232 days 
includes all arrests for this (criminal) case - petitioner responds 
9:26 a.m. Court inquires re: habeas corpus issue versus post-conviction issue 
Mr. Byington responds, have resolved part of issues in criminal matter and remaining 
issues would be part of post conviction - nothing further 
Court will take post-conviction matter under advisement and will do an amended order in 
criminal case. 
9:27 a.m. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Duaine Fredrick Earl 
1462 A South 1900 East 
Hazelton , 10 83335 
RE: Docket No. 39751 . 
Dear Mr. Earl: 
September 27 , 2012 
Enclosed is an Order from the Supreme Court Granting the Motion for 
Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule. Enclosed is the 
Clerk's Recor'd and Reporter's transcripts for your case. At this point, our office 
will no longer be representing you on your appeal case. 
If you have any questions pertaining to this issue, please feel free to call. 
Sincerely, 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, lD 83703 
Telephone: (208) 334-27 12 FAX: (208) 334-2985 
DATED this _______ day of September, 2012. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AND TO SUSPEND THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
e 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
PA TIY TEMPLE, CLERK 
Attn: SANTOS 
~ 
. -IDAHO COURT OF APPEALS 
#_- -- -- - -
Z MAR I 5 MIlO: 11 P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
PAfT~"f~~~~~~ 
MINIDOKA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
POBOX 368 
RUPERT, ID 83350 
Docket No. 39751-2012 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE FILED 
DUAINE FREDRICK 
EARL v. STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Minidoka County District Court 
#2011-697 
Enclosed is a copy of the CLERK'S CERTIFICATE for the above-entitled appeal, which 
was filed in this office on MARCH 8, 2012. 
Please carefully examine the TITLE and the CERTIFICATE and advise the District Court 
Clerk (or the Agency secretary, if applicable) AND this office of any errors detected on this 
document. 
The lITLE in the CERTIFICATE must appear on all DOCUMENTS filed in this Court, 
including all BRIEFS. An abbreviated version of the TITLE may be used if it clearly identifies . 
the parties to this appeal when the title is extremely long. 
03/1312012 DB 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
***** 
DUAINE FREDRICK EARL, )SUPREME COURT NO. 3CJ 75 I 
) 
Petitionerl Appellant. ) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
Vs. ) APPEAL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
DefendantlRespondent ) 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MINIDOKA COUNTY 
HONORABLEJONATHANP.BRODY 
CASE NO.: CV 2011-697 
ORDER OR JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: 
Judgment filed in the above entitled action on the 15th day of February, 2012. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Sara Thomas, IDAHO STATE APPELLA IE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, ID 83707 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: Lawrence O. Wasden, IDAHO ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, P. O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010 
APPEALED BY: DUAINE EARL . 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL . I -
MAR - 82012 
SuFeme Court_Court 
Entered on A TS 
110 
APPEALED AGAINST: STATE OF IDAHO 
- NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: February 27, 2012 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED: NA 
APPELLATE FEE PAID: NA 
WAS DISTRICT COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
REQUESTED: Yes 
NAME OF COURT REPORTER: Maureen Newton (hand-delivered) estimation of pages 
is less than 100 pages 
DATED: March 2, 2012 
Patty Temple 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY:,~~1S== 
Deputy Clerk of the District Court: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2-
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Standard Conditions of Release __________________________________ ~_. N __ ~~·~ __ ~ __________________ __ 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS SUPERVISION HANDBOOK 
For Probationers and Parolees 
"" .. ,:,., 
Idaho Department of Correction 
Division of Community Corrections 
ORIENTA TlON HANDBOOK 
You are required to report to the Department of Corrections as instructed by the Court 
or Parole Commission and/or the Intake Probation/Parole Officer after your hearing. 
You must meet with Community Corrections staff within 24 hours of your hearing and/ 
or release . Failure to report in the manner specified is a violation of your proba-
tion or parole and a Bench or Commission warrant will be requested for your ar-
rest. 
The purpose of this Orientation Manual is to explain the rules of and your re-
sponsibilities towards supervision on Probation or Parole either of which are 
considered a privilege and not a right. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As part of your conditions, you will be supervised in the community either on Proba-
tion or Parole by an idaho State Probation/Parole Officer, The purpose of supervi-
sion IS for your officer to monitor and enforce compliance with the conditions of your 
parole/probation, to protect the cornnlunity by assisting you in minimizing your fisk to 
reoffend, and to assist you in being a law-abiding community member. Probation/ 
Parole Officers serve as Officers of the Court as well as Agents for the Parole Com-
mission. Your Probation/Parole Officer assigned to you has the following responsi-
bilities, 
• Instruct yOll as to the conditions specified by the Court or the Parole Commission. 
" Instruct you as to the conditions of the Agreement of Supervision and what they 
mean. 
" Keep informed as to your compliance with the conditions of your supervision. 
• Keep informed as to your conduct and to report your conduct to the sentencing 
Court or Parole Commission. 
• Direct you to appropriate rehabililation, vocational, and educational programs to 
bring about improvements in your conduct and your situation. 
• Establish a case plan with you according to your risk assessment and ensure that 
you are complying with that plan. 
" Use supervision activities such as, but not limited to, verification of employment, 
verifying sources of income, monitoring of your associations, conducting record 
checks, placing restrictions on your travel, and testing you for the use of drugs 
and alcohol. 
• Impose intermediate sanctions for violations, if necessary or deemed appropriate, 
which may include electronic monitoring, increased contacts with your supervis-
ing officer, discretionary jail time, additional terms or conditions, order to show 
cause hearings before the Court, etc. 
• Assess the problems you may be experiencing such as unemployment, drug 
problems, alcohol problems, mental health issues, financial problems, lack of resi-
dence, family problems, etc. Your officer will develop a plan to address these is-
sues and will refer you to available community resources to assist you, 
COMMUNICATION 
It is essential that you understand the role of your Probation/Parole Officer and that 
their professional objective is to assist you in successfully completing your Probation 
or Parole. Your responsibilities are clearly outlined and specified by the Court or Pa-
role Commission. One of the keys to the successful completion of supervision is 
commur)ication. Take the responsibility of establishing a consistent pattern of com-
munication with your superviSing officer and your supervision can be a positive and 
rewarding expenence. 
COURT ORDER/PAROLE COMMISSION ORDER 
Depending on the procedure established by your assigned District, you may be re-
quired to initial all numbered items on your Court or Parole Commission Order dur-
ing your orientation. Regardless, you should always be given a copy of the order 
that governs your supervision and understand you are responsible for adhering to all 
written conditions. You will be further instructed on any specific conditions of your 
Court or Parole Commission Order. It is very important that you ask your Probation/ 
Parole Officer to clarify any issues or questions that you may have regarding the 
conditions and rules of supervision. 
AGREEMENT OF SUPERVISION 
You will initial and sign the Idaho Department of Correction Agreement of Supervi-
sion if you have been sentenced to probation by the Court. Parolees will sign and 
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initial the Parole Commission Order and special conditions. 80th of these docu-
ments cover the general conditions for Community Corrections supervision. Any 
special conditions will be covered in either your Court order or under the Special 
Conditions portion of your Parole order. Again make slire to communicate with your 
Probation/Parole Officer if you have any further questions regarding the rules. 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
Any complaints you may have must be addressed through an informal resolution 
with your Probation/Parole Officer prior to a grievance being filed. You need to first 
seek information, advice, or help on the matter from your supervising officer and 
then, if you are unable to resolve the problem, then you mGlY request to resolve the 
matter with the Section Supervisor. Should you choose to file a written grievance, 
then you have the right to appeal per the offender grievance process and may do so 
without the fear of retaliation. 
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS 
1. YOU SHALL ANSWER TRUTHFULLY ALL INQUIRIE~ BY THE PROBATION 
OFFICER AND FOLLOW THE ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PROBA-
TION/PAROLE OFFICER. 
The Probation/Parole Officer is responsible for knowing what is going on in many 
aspects of your life. You are required to answer questions truthfully and your offi-
cer may also verify any information you provide with outside sources such as fam-
ily, employers, etc. It is important to understand that directives from your officer 
are for ensuring your welfare, community safety, and are directly related to ensur-
ing compliance with your conditions. 
2. YOU SHALL SUPPORT YOUR DEPENDENTS AND MEET OTHER FAMILY 
RESPONSIBILITIES. 
Your Probation/Parole Officer may meet with family memb~rs or significant others to 
verify that YOLI are appropriately managing family responsibilities and to explain how 
the supervision process may affect them. The specific concntions of supervision that 
may impact immediate family members, significant others, (Jr friends residing in your 
home include your restrictions on travel, removal of ALL fir~arrns and weapons from 
the home, and your waiver of the 5 th amendment search clause which gives 100C 
personnel access to search at any time your residence, vehicles located at the resi-
dence, and all property. 
Your Probajon/Parole Officer may require that you provide verification monthly 
that you ha\le paid any Court ordered obligated child SUppO!i't. You may also be 
required to 3ubmit a monthly budget that provides verificati<l>n that you are meeting 
family responsibilities, maintaining all financial obligations, and living within your 
means. 
3. YOU SHALL NOT USE OR POSSESS ALCOHOLIC B~VERAGES. 
You shall not, at any time, possess, control, or consume any alcoholic beverages. 
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